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INCORPORATION AND JOINDER OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Mr. McGee incorporates by reference the Brief of Respondent Labor Commission, 
with attachments, as if fully set forth herein. Respondent McGee joins the Labor 
Commission in opposing LPI's appeal for the reasons stated in the Labor Commission's 
Brief, and those set forth below. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-
4-403, and § 78A-3-102. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c for 
abuse of discretion, where the Commission was commanded to determine whether work 
was "reasonably available" to Mr. McGee considering inter alia his "past work 
experience"? 
Standard of Review: Under this Court's decision in Morton Int 7 v. Tax Comm >?, 
814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991), this Court should review the Commission's judgment for 
abuse of discretion, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(3)(h)(i), and it should 
uphold Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c if it is within the bounds of reasonableness. King v. Indus. 
Comm % 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993). 
Preservation of this issue for review: LPI raised this issue before the Commission, 
thereby preserving it for review. (R 154-156). 
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Issue 2: Whether the Commission correctly determined that the Commission acted 
within its statutory authority when it promulgated Rule 612-1-10.D. 1 .c? 
Standard of Review: This Court should review for abuse of discretion because the 
Commission's authority to promulgate the Rule turned on whether the legislature 
conferred discretion to the Commission to interpret the statute. As noted under Issue 1, 
under this Court's decision in Morton Int'l v. Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 
1991), this Court should review the Commission's judgment for abuse of discretion, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(3)(h)(i), and it should uphold Rule 612-1-
10.D. 1 .c if it is within the bounds of reasonableness. King v. Indus. Comm 'n, 850 P.2d 
1281 (Utah App. 1993). 
Preservation of this issue for review: LPI raised this issue before the Commission, 
thereby preserving it for review. (R 154-156). 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1 )(c)(vi)( 1997): 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission 
shall conclude that: 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, 
taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past 
work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional 
capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(vi)(1997) (emphasis added). 
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2. The determinative rule is R612-1 -10(l)(c)(l): 
(1) Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and 
other provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably 
available to a claimant if such work meets the following criteria: 
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time 
of the accident the claimant was earning more than the 
state average weekly wage then in effect;... . 
R612-1-10 l.c.(l). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Course of the Proceedings: Mr. McGee permanently injured his low back and 
shoulder when he helped lift a 600 pound plus motor at work. Mr. McGee filed an 
application for hearing, seeking permanent total disability benefits as a result of his 
industrial injuries. 
The ALJ applied the Rule, which considered Mr. McGee's wages at the time of the 
accident. Pursuant to the wage considerations of the Rule, the ALJ found that Mr. 
McGee was entitled to an award of permanent total disability benefits. LPI submitted a 
re-employment plan to the ALJ, who approved the plan. On appeal, LPI challenged only 
the validity of the Rule, arguing that it conflicted with the statute, and that the 
Commission therefore exceeded its statutory when it promulgated the Rule. 
The Legislature commanded that the Commission determine if work was 
"reasonably available" to permanently totally disabled employees, when it considered the 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
five listed factors. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). One of the factors was "past 
work experience." Id. Because LPI did not challenge the underlying facts, and because 
only the wage portion of the Rule was implicated in the ALJ's award of benefits, only the 
Rule's wage considerations were at issue, and were central to the issues on appeal. 
Nature of the Case: This Court agreed to review two issues: (1) whether the Court 
of Appeals correctly reviewed the Labor Commission's Order for abuse of discretion; and 
(2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Commission acted within 
its statutory authority to promulgate the Rule at issue. R612-1 -10.D. 1 .c. 
The Court of appeals affirmed the Commission's Rule as a valid exercise of 
implied discretion. The Court held that the Legislative implicity conferred discretion to 
the Commission when it changed the Commission with determining if work was 
"reasonably available" to injured employees. The Court also held that the Rule was a 
valid exercise of statutory authority because the Rule was consistent with the statute. 
LPI argued that the Legislature's use of the term "reasonably available" did not 
confer discretion to the Commission, and that this Court should use a correction of error 
standard of review. It also argued that the Rule conflicted with the statute. 
This case turns on whether the Legislature conferred discretion to the Commission. 
It also turns on whether considering "past work experience" includes consideration of 
employees' wages when they were part of the employees "past work experience." 
-10-
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If the Legislature conferred some measure of discretion to the Commission to 
interpret the statute, then this Court must review the Rule for abuse of discretion. But if 
the term "reasonably available" conferred no discretion to the Commission, this Court 
must determine if considering "past work experience" included consideration of 
employees' wages. If the plain meaning of considering "past work experience" included 
considering employees' wages as part of their experience, then the Rule - which 
considered wages as part of "past work experience" - was consistent with the statute, and 
the Commission acted within its statutory authority. 
If the term "past work experience" is ambiguous, then this Court must look to the 
purpose, history, and structure of the Act to determine if the Rule's consideration of 
wages was reasonably subsumed in consideration of "past work experience." 
The Commission has discretion to determine what "reasonable" means in the 
context of § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). It also has discretion to determine whether 
consideration of wages may be considered under its duty to consider employees' "past 
work experience." The Commission's judgment on that issue, as embodied by Rule 612-
1-10.D.1, and as applied to Mr. McGee's award of permanent total disability benefits, 
should be upheld by this Court. 
-11-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In November 2002, McGee filed an Application for Hearing seeking various 
Workers' Compensation benefits related to a July 2001 industrial injury with LPI 
Services. (R.0002.) 
In August 2003, McGee filed an Amended Application seeking permanent total 
disability compensation. ( R. 00025.) Defendants' vocational expert testified that McGee 
was capable of working as a lens stylist with a starting wage of $7.00 per hour, plus 
commission of $2.50 per hour or more and income potential of between $12.00 to $13.00 
per hour; or as a car rental reservationist with a starting wage of $7.29 per hour, plus 
commissions of $2.50 per hour or more and income potential of between $12.00 to 
$13.00 per hour. ( R. 0040.) 
In April 2004, the ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order. ( R. 0033-48). McGee earned $17.50 per hour at the time of the alleged injury. ( 
R. 0034, 0040-41.) The average weekly wage for the State of Utah was $13.86 per hour. 
( R. 0040-41.) Because McGee's wages on the date of accident exceeded the current state 
average weekly wage, and the jobs paid a wage lower than the state average weekly wage, 
they violated the Rule. ( R. 0033-0048.) The two jobs located by Mr. Eversen, 
defendants' vocational expert, at most paid $13.00 per hour, or less than the average 
weekly wage for the State of Utah as of July 4, 2001. ( R. 0045.) The ALJ determined 
that "no evidence existed that any employment remained reasonably available to Mr. 
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McGee as of the date of the hearing pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code § 34A-2-
413(a)(c)(iv) and Utah Administrative Code R.612-1 -1O.D. 1 .c ( R.0045.) The ALJ 
concluded that McGee was permanently and totally disabled. 
In April 2004, the defendants filed a notice of intent to file a reemployment plan, 
which was filed in May 2004. ( R.0049-50; R. 0053-72.) In September 2004, an 
evidentiary hearing was held with respect to the reemployment plan. ( R.0143.) In 
February 2005, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order, 
wherein the defendants' reemployment plan was determined to be reasonable designed to 
return McGee to gainful employment. (R.0143-147.) 
Defendants timely filed a Motion for Review contesting the ALJ's determination 
that pursuant to the administrative rule, McGee is permanently and totally disabled. 
(R.0154-67). McGee opposed the Motion for Review, claiming that the consideration of 
gross income, available wage rates, and the current state average weekly wage rate "did 
not 'abridge, enlarge, extend, or modify" the five statutory criteria. ( R. 0170.) 
In December 2006, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision. ( R.0193-97.) 
The Labor Commission admittedly took a "broader view of the statutory term 'past work 
experience^ than defendants ( R.202.) 
A timely Petition for Review was filed with the Utah Court of Appals. The parties 
disagreed over the applicable standard of review. Defendants insisted that whether an 
administrative rule conflicts with a statute is a question of law that involves no fact 
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finding and no application of any facts to law, and therefore no deference is given to the 
agency. McGee and the Labor Commission argued for an abuse of discretion standard, 
claiming that the Labor Commission should be given discretion to determine whether 
rules that it promulgates conflict with state statutes. 
The Court of Appeals held that the Labor Commission had been given implied 
discretion to interpret the statute because the statute required the Commission to 
determine if work was "reasonably available," taking into account the five listed factors. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute "implicitly granted the Commission 
deference" to interpret the statute because "[t]he Utah legislature did not and has not 
defined what the term 'reasonably' means in the context of this statute." LPI Servs. v. 
Labor Comm % 2007 UT App. 375 at K 15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. The legislature implicitly conferred discretion to the Commission to 
interpret the permanent total disability statute when it charged the Commission with 
determining whether work was "reasonably available," in considering the five listed 
factors. 
The portion of the Rule at issue considered one of the five factors: "past work 
experience." This Court should uphold the Rule if it concludes that "past work 
experience" plainly included employees' wages as part of their "past work experience." 
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This Court should also uphold the Rule if it finds that the term "past work 
experience" was ambiguous. This Court should reasonably construe consideration of 
"past work experience" to include consideration of employees wages for two compelling 
reasons. First, every type of compensation payable under the Act requires consideration 
of employees wages as a precondition to payment of compensation. Second, the purpose 
and history of the Act were consistent with consideration of employees' wages in 
permanent total disability claims, 
This Court should uphold the Rule as a valid exercise of legislative authority -
either because considering employees' wages is plainly part of their "past work 
experience" when employees were paid wages for their work, or because the Commission 
reasonably interpreted "past work experience" consistent with the structure, purpose and 
history of the Act. 
For these reasons, this Court should uphold the Court of Appeals' decision, and 
deny LPI's appeal. 
-15-
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ARGUMENT 
I. Because The Statute Required The Commission to Determine Whether 
Work Was "Reasonably Available" To Mr. McGee, The Court of 
Appeals Correctly Reviewed The Commission's Rule for Abuse of 
Discretion. 
The permanent total disability statute conferred implied discretion for the 
Commission to interpret whether work was "reasonably available'- to Mr. McGee, taking 
into consideration his "past work experience." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). 
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. 
Appellate Courts defer to agency interpretations where the statute confers 
discretion to the agency. "Appellate courts defer to an agency's statutory interpretation 
only when there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language in 
question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language, 
(citations and internal punctuation omitted)." "Utah Standards of Appellate Review -
Revised" Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Bar Journal, Vol. 12, No.8, October 1999. 
In Morton International, this Court observed that: 
grants of discretion may be implied from the statutory 
language. For example, we have held that when the operative 
terms of a statute are broad and generalized, these terms 
bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to 
the responsible agency. We have also granted an agency's 
statutory interpretation deference when the statutory language 
suggested that the legislature had left the specific question at 
issue unresolved. 
-16-
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814P.2dat 590. 
In this case, the legislature directed the Commission to determine if work was 
"reasonably available" to Mr. McGee, taking into consideration inter alia his "past work 
experience." The Legislature did not define "reasonably" in the Workers Compensation 
Act, and is subject to multiple plausible interpretations. The Legislature's use of the term 
"reasonably" "bespeaks a legislative intent to delegate [its] interpretation to the 
responsible agency." Morton, Id. 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the language of the statute 
conferred implied discretion to the Commission: "[BJecause 'reasonably' is a broad and 
generalized term that has 'multiple permissible interpretations,' the Commission's 
expertise and experience in making sound policy decisions is necessary to interpret the 
meaning of the phrase 'other work reasonably available.'" LP 1*1 16 (internal citations 
omitted). This Court should conclude that the Commission correctly reviewed for abuse 
of discretion because the legislature implicitly conferred discretion when it required the 
Commission to determine if work was "reasonably available" to Mr. McGee. 
This Court's opinion in Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus / Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384, shed no light on the standard of 
review for the case at bar. The issue in Martinez was whether the Court of Appeals 
correctly reviewed the Commission's factual findings for abuse of discretion or 
substantial evidence. Id. TJ 22. This Court held that the Commission's findings of 
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whether work was reasonably available were factual determinations, Id- H 32, and were 
reviewed for substantial evidence. Id. ^  35. In contrast, LPI argued that Martinez 
restricted the Commission's discretion based on statute's five listed factors, Brief at 20. 
But it cited as support this Court's analysis of reviewing findings of fact for substantial 
evidence, Martinez at 32. Martinez, however, did not address the standard of review for 
the Rule at issue. LPI also argued that under Martinez, subsection (c) only gave the 
Commission discretion to make findings of fact, and to determine if the facts satisfied the 
statute. Brief at 17. Curiously, the Brief quoted Martinez's burden of proof analysis as 
support for a correction of error standard of review.1 The Brief contained other novel 
1
 LPFs Brief argued that this Court's Martinez decision governed the 
standard of review in this case, Brief at 17, but then cited as authority the part of the 
opinion that addressed the employee's burden of proof. The Brief contained the 
following quote from Martinez under its standard of review section: 
We . . . hold that the language of subsection (c) grants the 
Commission authority to determine only whether the facts 
presented meet the statute's requirements for a finding of 
permanent total disability. Id. at lj 42 (emphasis added). 
Brief at 17. But the next sentence of Martinez stated, "[The language of subsection (c)] 
does not bestow on the Commission the authority to allocate the burden of proof." 
Martinez at ^  42 (emphasis added). The Brief took this Court's quote out of context: This 
Court was not considering the standard of review - but the employee's burden of proof. 
Martinez did not address the standard of review for the Rule at issue. Instead, this Court 
must determine whether the statute conferred discretion to the Commission when it 
required the Commission to decide if work was "reasonably available" to injured 
employees, and whether the Rule is a reasonable exercise of that discretion. 
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arguments in support of a correction of error review.2 But reviewing for agency 
discretion is a well-developed body of law. As shown above, if the legislature conferred 
discretion to the Commission, this Court must review the Rule for abuse of discretion. 
This Court should hold that the legislature conferred implied discretion to the 
Commission when it directed the Commission to determine whether work was 
"reasonably available" to Mr. McGee. This Court should uphold the Court of Appeals' 
review of the Rule for abuse of discretion, and deny LPI's appeal. 
2
 For example, the Esquivel case cited was distinguishable from the case at 
bar because it did not involve a statutory grant of discretion - much less a Rule based on 
that discretion. Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, K 19, 7 P.3d 777, 781. 
Another example was its argument that the legislature's wholesale change of 
permanent total disability requirements in 1995 was actually an effort to "curtail the 
commission's prior authority to promulgate rules." Brief at 19. But pre-1994 permanent 
total disability claims had fundamentally different requirements than post-94 claims: pre-
1994 claims followed the substance of the Social Security's sequential decision making 
process. Accordingly, before the law changed in 1995, the legislature allowed the 
Commission to adopt Rules that followed that sequential decision making process. Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67. But after the legislature changed the requirements for permanent; 
total disability claims, there was no point to authorize the Commission to draft Rules that 
followed the old law. Removing the pre-1994 rulemaking statute was a housekeeping 
measure - not an effort to rein in the Commission. To the contrary, the Brief admitted 
that the Commission has the statutory authority to draft rules consistent with the Act. 
Brief at 19. But none of these novel arguments shed light on whether the legislature's use 
of "reasonably available" work conferred discretion to the commission to interpret the 
statute. 
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II. The Labor Commission Was Authorized to Promulgate the Rule 
Because The Rule Was Consistent With the Statute. 
This Court should hold that Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c was consistent with § 34A-2-
413(l)(c)(iv), and affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. LP I Services v. Labor 
Commission, 2007 UT App. 375. To prove entitlement to permanent total disability 
benefits, injured employees must prove that work is not "reasonably available" to them. 
Utah Code Ann. §34-A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). The legislature identified five factors the 
Commission must consider to determine if work is reasonably available to employees: 
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Id. (emphasis added). This Court observed that "these [five] factual considerations 
inform what is reasonable." Martinez, 132. Citing Martinez, the Court of Appeals noted 
that "the term 'reasonably5 implies a judgment informed by a set of facts." LPI% 17. 
To facilitate these factual determinations, the Commission promulgated the Rule, 
which defined "reasonably available" work in pertinent pait: "The work provides a gross 
income at least equivalent to the current state average weekly wage .. .." R612-1-
lO.D.l.c. While the Commission must consider employees' "past work experience," the 
legislature did not define that term under § 413. The Commission interpreted the term 
"past work experience" to include wages. Accordingly, the Rule considered employees' 
wages as part of its "reasonable availability" analysis. R 612-1 -10.D. 1 .c. The essence of 
the parties' dispute is whether consideration of "past work experience" includes 
consideration of employees'wages. 
-20-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
If the plain language of the statute included consideration of wages, then this Court 
must uphold the Rule as consistent with the statute. Alternatively, if "past work 
experience" was ambiguous, then this Court should construe that the term to include 
employees' wages when they were part of their "past work experience." In either case, 
the Rule was consistent with the statute, and this Court should affirm the Court of 
Appeals' decision. 
A. Where Employees Were Paid Wages For Their Past Work, Their 
Wages Were Plainly Part of Their "Past Work Experience." 
The plain meaning of "past work experience" included wages where they were part 
of an employee's "past work experience." This Court first considers the plain meaning of 
the statute. Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, 2008 UT 21, U 9, 182 P.3d 333, 335. 
Webster's dictionary defines past as: "1 a: ago <12 years past> b: just gone or elapsed 
<for the past few months>"; work as: "(1) activity in which one exerts strength or 
faculties to do or perform something (a): sustained physical or mental effort to overcome 
obstacles and achieve an objective or result (b): the labor, task, or duty that is one's 
accustomed means of livelihood"; and, experience as: 1 (a): direct observation of or 
participation in events as a basis of knowledge (b): the fact or state of having been 
affected by or gained knowledge through direct observation or participation."3 In other 
3
 Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary; 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/past 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/work 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/experience 
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words, if an employee participated in work that paid wages, then those wages are part of 
her "past work experience." The plain language of the statute encompassed consideration 
of wages as part of the employees' "past work experience." 
This Court should consider all of the words chosen by the legislature, and not just 
those defined in LPI's Brief. Courts presume that the Legislature used each statutory 
term advisedly, and must try to harmonize the statute by giving effect to each clause and 
word in the statute. State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, K 10, 44 P.3d 680 (cited by LPI 
with approval at 38). But LPI's Brief omitted most of the definition of "past work 
experience." The Brief included only the definition of "experience," and omitted the 
definitions of "past" and "work." Brief at 43. By failing to define all of the words in the 
entire term, the Brief ignored the specific words chosen by the Legislature. Instead, "past 
work experience" plainly includes employees wages where wages were part of their "past 
work experience." 
This Court should conclude that the Rule was consistent with the Statute. The 
Commission was authorized to promulgate rules consistent with the Statute. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 34A-1-301 and 304. Because "past work experience" plainly subsumes 
employees' wages when they were part of their "past work experience," this Court should 
uphold the Rule as a valid exercise of statutory authority. 
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B. If "Past Work Experience" Was Ambiguous, This Court Should 
Reasonably Interpret That Term To Include Employee's Wages, 
Consistent With The Purpose, History, and Structure of the Act 
Alternatively, if this Court finds the term "past work experience" was ambiguous, 
then the purpose and structure of the Act shows that employees' wages must be 
considered in determining their rights to permanent total disability compensation. "When 
interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try to discover the underlying intent of the 
legislature, guided by the meaning and purpose of the statute as a whole and the 
legislative history." Bluffdale Mountain v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, \ 70, 167 P.3d 
1016, 1035 (internal citations omitted). A central purpose of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act is to pay wage replacement compensation to injured workers. Reteuna 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 55 Utah 258, 185 P.535, 537 (1919). The Commission must "liberally 
construe[] and apply[] the Act to provide coverage and resolve any doubt respecting 
compensation in favor of an injured employee." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm'/?, 
2007 UT 4, H 16, 153P.3d 179. 
"Past work experience" subsumes employee's wages in the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. The Act is premised on wage-based employment. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-401(l)(a).4 A central purpose of the workers compensation act is to pay injured 
workers wage replacement compensation. Reteuna v. Indus. Comm'«, 55 Utah 258, 185 
4
 "An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment.. . shall be paid . . . compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury or death." Utah Code Ann. § 34-A-2-401. 
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P. 535, 537 (1919) (cited with approval in LPI at D 20). 
The structure of the Act shows that wages should be considered as part of 
employees' "past work experience." There are five types of compensation under the Act.5 
Each of the five compensation is specifically tied to a consideration of the employees' 
wages - including the permanent total disability statute. Id. at § 34A-2-410 through § 
414. Earning wages is a precondition to receiving compensation under the Act. Id. 
Therefore, every claim for compensation necessarily includes consideration of 
employees' wages. 
Further, the Act applies to Utah's market economy where employees earn 
competitive wages based on their employer's demand for their qualifications and skills. 
As the Court of Appeals noted, "We conclude that past work experience necessarily raises 
the issues associated with a competitive labor market, including wages." LPI% 22. In 
contrast, excluding wage consideration ignores an essential (and for some, the most 
important) part of the employment relationship, to the employees' detriment, and to the 
employers' benefit. Considering employees' wages as pari of "past work experience," on 
the other hand, is consistent with the purpose, history and continued viability of the Act as 
the employees' exclusive remedy for their work injuries. If this Court finds that "past 
5
 Under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the amount of temporary total 
compensation, § 34A-2-410, temporary partial compensation § 34A-2-411, permanent 
partial compensation § 34A-2-412, permanent total compensation § 34A-2-413, and 
compensation for death § 34A-2-414, are each tied to the employee's wages at the time of 
the accident or death. 
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work experience" was ambiguous, it should hold that employees' wages were part of 
"past work experience,'- and uphold the Rule because it was consistent with the statute. 
The cases cited by LPI were distinguishable from this case. In Sanders Brine 
Shrimp v. Audit Div. Of the Utah State Tax Comm'«, 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993), the 
statute at issue defined "manufacturer" by reference to the Standard Industrial 
Classification code. The Tax Commission's rule imposed additional definitional 
elements. This Court struck down the rule because the legislature had given the 
Commission no discretion to further interpret the statute. In Draughton v. Dep 7 of 
Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1999), this Court invalidated a DHRM 
rule that limited protections against demotion, but were statutorily protected. This Court 
concluded that the rule conflicted with the statute's scheme of protecting against 
demotions, and invalidated the rule. 
These cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because there was no statutory 
grant of discretion in the former, and in the latter, the rule was inconsistent with the 
statute.6 But in this case, the legislature required the Commission to exercise its judgment 
in determining whether work was "reasonably available" to employees, and as shown 
6
 Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), is also distinguishable because it was issued before the standard of review 
jurisprudence articulated in Morton International v. Tax Comm 7i, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); King v. Indus. Comm 'w, 850 P.2d 1281 
(Utah App. 1993), and others. Crowther did not address agency discretion and presumed 
that a correction of error standard applied. 
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above, considering "past work experience" plainly included consideration of employees' 
wages as part of employees' past work experience. 
In summary, the Commission's interpretation of the Statute as articulated in the 
Rule was reasonable because it was consistent with the plain language of the statute, the 
purpose of the Act, and the structure of the Act - which considers employees' wages as a 
precondition to payment of every type of compensation. This Court should uphold the 
Rule as a reasonable exercise of implied discretion conferred by statute. Alternatively, 
this Court should uphold the Rule as consistent with the plain language of the statute, 
which required the Commission to consider employees' wages as part of their "past work 
experience." This Court should hold that the Commission acted within its statutory 
authority when it promulgated the Rule, and affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision because the Legislature 
implicitly granted discretion to the Commission to interpret the statute when it charged 
the Commission with determining if work was "reasonably available" in pennanent total 
disability claims. The plain meaning of considering employees' k*past work experience" 
included consideration of their wages, if that was part of their work experience. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Rule because it was consistent with the statute, 
and therefore a valid exercise of statutory authority. Alternativeh'. if this Court finds the 
term "past work experience" was ambiguous, then the history, purpose and structure of 
the Act show that wages should be considered as part of employees" "pas* work 
experience." For these reasons, this Court should deny LPTs appeal, and uphold the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary as Petitioner's LPI's Brief and Respondent Labor 
Commission's Brief contain all of the materials pertinent to this appeal. 
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